Abstract. Notions of k-asimulation and asimulation are introduced as asymmetric counterparts to k-bisimulation and bisimulation, respectively. It is proved that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some k, and then that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations. Finally, it is proved that a firstorder formula is intuitionistically equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations between intuitionistic models.
version, also isolates a single property defining expressive powers of modal propositional logic and thus gives us an important insight into its nature when this logic is viewed as a fragment of first-order logic.
It is somewhat surprising that results analogous to Van Benthem's modal characterization theorem and its parametrized version were not obtained thus far for the intuitionistic propositional logic, although the view of the latter as a fragment of modal propositional logic has a long and established tradition dating back to Tarski-Gödel translation of this logic into S4. The present paper fills this gap.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Starting from some notational conventions and preliminary remarks in section 1, we then move on to the proof of a 'parametrized' version of model-theoretic characterization of intuitionistic propositional logic in section 2 and finally prove the full unparametrized counterpart to Van Benthem's characterization theorem for intuitionistic propositional logic in section 3. From this latter result we derive a characterization of equivalence of a first-order formula to a standard translation of intuitionistic formula on the class of intuitionistic models. This latter result is of special interest, given that, unlike in the case of modal propositional logic, not every first-order model can be treated as a model of intuitionistic propositional logic. Finally, in section 4 we sum up and state some directions for further research.
Preliminaries
A formula is a formula of classical predicate logic with identity whose predicate letters are in vocabulary Σ = { R 2 , P 1 1 , . . . P 1 n , . . . }. A model is a model of this logic. We refer to formulas with lower-case Greek letters distinct from α and β, and to sets of formulas with upper-case Greek letters distinct from Σ. If ϕ is a formula, then we associate with it the following finite vocabulary Σ ϕ ⊆ Σ such that Σ ϕ = { R 2 }∪{ P i | P i occurs in ϕ }. If ψ is a formula, Σ ′ ⊆ Σ and every predicate letter occurring in ψ is in Σ ′ , then we call ψ a Σ ′ -formula.
We refer to sequence x 1 , . . . , x n of any objects asx n . If all free variables of a formula ϕ coincide with a variable x, we write ϕ(x). If all free variables of formulas in Γ coincide with x, we write Γ(x). We refer to the domain of a model M by D(M ). A pointed model is a pair (M, a), where M is a first-order model and a ∈ D(M ). If (M, a) is a pointed model, we write M, a |= ϕ(x) and say that ϕ(x) is true at (M, a) iff for any variable assignment f in M such that f (x) = a, we have M, f |= ϕ(x). It follows from this convention that truth of a formula ϕ(x) at a pointed model is to some extent independent from the choice of its only free variable.
An intuitionistic formula is a formula of intuitionistic propositional logic. We refer to intuitionistic formulas with letters i, j, k, possibly with primes or subscripts. We assume a standard Kripke semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic.
If x is an individual variable in a first-order language, then by standard x-translation of intuitionistic formulas into formulas we mean the following map ST defined by induction on the complexity of the corresponding intuitionistic formula. The induction goes as follows:
ST (p n , x) = P n (x); ST (⊥, x) = (x = x);
Standard conditions are imposed on the variables x, y. By degree of a formula we mean the greatest number of nested quantifiers occurring in it. Degree of a formula ϕ is denoted by r(ϕ). Its formal definition by induction on the complexity of ϕ goes as follows:
A parametrized version of the main result
We start with the definition of an 'intuitionistic' counterpart of k-bisimulation.
, the following conditions hold:
Lemma 1. Let ϕ(x) = ST (i, x) for some intuitionistic formula i, and let r(ϕ) = k.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of i. In what follows we will abbreviate the induction hypothesis by IH. Basis. Let i = p n . Then ϕ(x) = P n (x) and we reason as follows:
α, a ′ |= P n (x) (premise) (4) (5) and (6)) (7) β, b ′ |= P n (x) (from (4) and (7))
The case i = ⊥ is obvious.
and we reason as follows:
m + r(ST (j, x)) ≤ l (from (11) and (12)) (16) m + r(ST (k, x)) ≤ l (from (11) and (13)) (17)
(from (9), (14) and (16) by IH) (18)
(from (9), (15) and (17) by IH) (19) (18) and (19)) (20)
. Assume, without a loss of generality, that α, a ′ |= ST (j, x). Then we reason as follows: (23) and (24)) (25) (22) and (25) by IH) (26)
and let
This means that we can choose a b
. We now reason as follows:
m < l (from (31) and (32)) (33) (29), (30) and (33) by (2)) Now choose an a ′′ for which (34) is satisfied; we add the premises following from our choice of a ′′ and continue our reasoning as follows:
m + 1 + r(ST (j, y)) ≤ l (from (31) and (38)) (40) (35) and (44)
The last line contradicts our initial assumption that
Definition 2. A formula ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to k-asimulations iff for any
Example 2. Consider again models M and N and binary relation A from Example 1. Formula ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ P (y)) is true at (M, a), but not at (N, d). So, since for every k ∈ N A is an (M, a), (N, d) k -asimulation, we get that there is no k such that this formula is invariant with respect to k-asimulations. Corollary 1. If ϕ(x) is a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula and r(ϕ) = k, then ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to k-asimulations.
Corollary 1 immediately follows from Lemma 1 setting α = M , β = N , m = 0, l = k, a ′ = a and b ′ = b. Before we state and prove the parametrized version of our main result, we need to mention a fact from the classical model theory of first-order logic.
Lemma 2. For any finite predicate vocabulary Σ ′ , any variable x and any natural k there are, up to logical equivalence, only finitely many
This fact is proved as Lemma 3.4 in [Ebbinghaus et al. 1984, pp. 189-190] .
is a standard xtranslation of an intuitionistic formula; and (2) there is a pointed model
Lemma 3. For any formula ϕ(x), any natural k, any
Proof. Let { ψ 1 (x) . . . , ψ n (x), . . . } be the set of all (Σ ϕ , x, k)-formulas that are standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas true at (M, a). This set is non-empty since ST (⊥ → ⊥, x) will be true at (M, a). Due to Lemma 2, we can choose in this set a non-empty finite subset { ψ i1 (x) . . . , ψ in (x) } such that any formula from the bigger set is logically equivalent to (and hence follows from) a formula in this subset. Therefore, every formula in the bigger set follows from ψ i1 (x) ∧ . . . ∧ ψ in (x) and we also have
Lemma 4. For any formula ϕ(x) and any natural k there are, up to logical equivalence, only finitely many complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunctions.
Proof. It suffices to observe that for any formula ϕ(x) and any natural k, a complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction is a (Σ ϕ , x, k)-formula. Our lemma then follows from Lemma 2.
In what follows we adopt the following notation for the fact that for any variable x all (Σ ϕ , x, k)-formulas that are standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas true at (M, a), are also true at (N, b):
Theorem 1. Let r(ϕ(x)) = k and let ϕ(x) be invariant with respect to k-asimulations. Then ϕ(x) is equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula.
Proof. We may assume that both ϕ(x) and ¬ϕ(x) are satisfiable, since both ⊥ and ⊤ are obviously invariant with respect to k-asimulations and we have, for example, the following valid formulas:
We may also assume that there are two complete (ϕ, x, k+2)-conjunctions Ψ(x), Ψ ′ (x) such that Ψ ′ (x) |= Ψ(x), and both formulas Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x) and Ψ ′ (x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x) are satisfiable.
For suppose otherwise. Then take the set of all complete (ϕ, x, k + 2)-conjunctions Ψ(x) such that the formula Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x) is satisfiable. This set is non-empty, because ϕ(x) is satisfiable, and by Lemma 3, it can be satisfied only together with some complete (ϕ, x, k + 2)-conjunction. Now, using Lemma 4, choose in it a finite nonempty subset { Ψ i1 (x) . . . , Ψ in (x) } such that any complete (ϕ, x, k + 2)-conjunction is equivalent to an element of this subset. We can show that ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to Ψ i1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ Ψ in (x). In fact, if M, a |= ϕ(x) then, by Lemma 3, at least one complete (ϕ, x, k + 2)-conjunction is true at (M, a) and therefore, its equivalent in { Ψ i1 (x) . . . , Ψ in (x) } is also true at (M, a), and so, finally we have
and by the choice of Ψ ij (x) the formula Ψ ij (x) ∧ ϕ(x) is satisfiable, so, by our assumption, the formula Ψ ij (x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x) must be unsatisfiable, and hence ϕ(x) must follow from Ψ ij (x). But in this case we will have M, a |= ϕ(x) as well. So ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to Ψ i1 (x) ∨ . . . , ∨Ψ in (x) but the latter formula, being a disjunction of conjunctions of standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas, is itself a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula, and so we are done.
If, on the other hand, one can take two complete (ϕ,
, and formulas Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x) and Ψ ′ (x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x) are satisfiable, we reason as follows. Take a pointed Σ ϕ -model (M, a) such that M, a |= Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x) and for any (Σ ϕ , x, k + 2)-formula ψ(x), if ψ(x) is a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula true at (M, a), then ψ(x) follows from Ψ(x), and take any pointed model (N, b) such that N, b |= Ψ ′ (x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x). We can construct an (M, a), (N, b) k -asimulation and thus obtain a contradiction in the following way.
Let
By choice of Ψ(x), Ψ ′ (x) and the independence of truth at a pointed model from the choice of a single free variable in a formula we obviously have (a)A(b).
Further, since the degree of any atomic formula is 0, and the above condition implies
In this case we will also have m + 1 ≤ k. Then consider the following two sets:
These sets are non-empty, since by our assumption we have k + 1 − m ≥ 1. Therefore, as we have r(ST (⊥, x)) = 0 and r(ST (⊥ → ⊥, x)) = 1, we will also have ST (⊥, x) ∈ ∆ and ST (⊥ → ⊥, x) ∈ Γ. Then, according to our Lemma 2, there are finite non-empty sets of logical equivalents for both Γ and ∆. Choosing these finite sets, we in fact choose some finite
But then we obtain that the formula
} is, by their choice, a (Σ ϕ , x, k + 1 − m)-formula, and so the implication under consideration must be a
and therefore this implication must be false at (α, a ′ ) as well. But then take any a ′′ ∈ D(α) such that a ′ R α a ′′ and a ′′ verifies the conjunction in the antecedent of the formula but falsifies its consequent. We must conclude then, by the choice of
′′ |= Γ and so, by the definition of A, and given that
Since, in addition, a ′′ falsifies every formula from { ST (j 1 , x) . . . ST (j u , x) }, then, by the choice of this set, we must conclude that every (Σ ϕ , x, k + 1 − m)-formula that is a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula false at (β, b ′′ ) is also false at (α, a ′′ ). But then, again by the definition of A, and given the fact that m + 1 ≤ k, we must also have (
, and so condition (2) holds.
Therefore A is an (M, a), (N, b) k -asimulation and we have got our contradiction in place.
Theorem 2. A formula ϕ(x) is equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula iff there exists a k ∈ N such that ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to k-asimulations.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be equivalent to ST (i, x). Then by Corollary 1, ST (i, x) is invariant with respect to r(ST (i, x))-asimulations, and, therefore, so is ϕ(x). In the other direction, let ϕ(x) be invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some k. If k ≤ r(ϕ), then every r(ϕ)-asimulation is k-asimulation, so ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to r(ϕ)-asimulations and hence, by Theorem 1, ϕ(x) is equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula. If, on the other hand, r(ϕ) < k, then set l = k − r(ϕ) and consider variablesȳ l not occurring in ϕ(x). Then r(∀ȳ l ϕ(x)) = k and ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to ∀ȳ l ϕ(x), so the latter formula is also invariant with respect to k-asimulations, and hence by Theorem 1 ∀ȳ l ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula. But then ϕ(x) is equivalent to this standard x-translation as well.
The main result
We begin with a definition of an 'intuitionistic' counterpart to bisimulation:
′ ∈ D(β) whenever we have a ′ Ab ′ , the following conditions hold:
Example 3. Consider again models M and N from Example 1. Binary relation
Lemma 5. Let A be an (M, a), (N, b) -asimulation, and let
Proof. We obviously have (a)A ′ (b), and since for any α, β ∈ { M, N }, and any (c n , c 
′′ ) so condition (2) for A ′ is fulfilled for every k.
Definition 5. A formula ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to asimulations iff for any
Example 4. Consider again models M and N from Example 1. Since ∃y(R(x, y)∧P (y)) is true at (M, a), but not at (N, d) , the fact that binary relation B from Example 3 is an (M, a), (N, d) -asimulation means that this formula is not invariant with respect to asimulations.
Corollary 2. If ϕ(x) is equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula, then ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to asimulations.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula, let A be an (M, a), (N, b) -asimulation and let A ′ be defined as in Lemma 5. Then by this Lemma A ′ is an (M, a), (N, b) k -asimulation for every k. So if we have M, a |= ϕ(x), but not N, b |= ϕ(x), then ϕ(x) is not invariant with respect to k-asimulations for any k, which is in contradiction with Theorem 2.
In what follows we will also need some notions and facts from model theory of modal propositional logic. Thus, standard modal x-translation T r(m, x) of a modal propositional formula m in first-order logic is defined by the following induction on the complexity of modal propositional formula:
T r(¬m, x) = ¬T r(m, x); T r(✷m, x) = ∀y(R(x, y) → T r(m, y)).
Another important idea is the notion of bisimulation: (N, b) -bisimulation iff aEb and for any a ′ ∈ M , b ′ ∈ N , whenever a ′ Eb ′ , the following conditions hold:
Definition 7. A formula ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to bisimulations iff for any Σ
The concept of standard modal translation and that of bisimulation invariance are tied together by Van Benthem's famous modal characterization theorem: Theorem 3. A formula ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to bisimulations iff it is equivalent to a standard modal x-translation of a modal propositional formula.
Its proof can be found, for example, in [Blackburn et al. 2001, Theorem 2.68, pp. 103-104] . It is easy to see that our main result below (Theorem 5) is in an analogy with Van Benthem's characterization theorem for intuitionistic propositional logic both in its formulation and in methods of proof employed.
Lemma 6. Let ϕ(x) be a formula invariant with respect to asimulations. Then:
1. ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to bisimulations.
¬ϕ(x)
is invariant with respect to bisimulations.
It is easy to verify that A is an (M, a), (N, b) -asimulation: we obviously have aAb, and condition (46) is fulfilled.
To verify (47), assume that a (M, a), (N, b) -asimulation and ϕ(x) is not invariant with respect to asimulations, contrary to our assumption. The first statement of the lemma is proved.
(
In the previous paragraph it was established that A verifies conditions (46) and (47). But since aEb, we also have bAa and so A is in fact an (N, b), (M, a) -asimulation, which contradicts our assumption that ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to asimulations.
Definition 8. A model M is called m-saturated iff for any a ∈ D(M ) and for any set Θ(x) of standard modal x-translations of modal propositional formulas it is true that
In what follows we adopt the following notation for the fact that for any x all Σ ′ -formulas that are standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas true at (M, a), are also true at (N, b):
Proof. It is obvious that aAb, and since for any unary predicate letter P and variable x formula P (x) is a standard x-translation of an atomic intuitionistic formula, condition (46) is trivially satisfied for ≤ Σ ′ . To verify condition (47), choose any α, β ∈ { M, N }, and a
Then choose any variable x and consider the following two sets:
We have by the choice of Γ, ∆ that for every finite Γ ′ ⊆ Γ and
, the standard translation of every such implication must be false at (α, a ′ ) as well. This means that every finite subset of the set
} if the finite set in question has an empty intersection with ∆ and Γ ′ = { ST (⊥ → ⊥, x) } if it has an empty intersection with Γ.) But by Corollary 2 and Lemma 6 every formula in the set under consideration is invariant with respect to bisimulations and hence equivalent to a standard modal x-translation of a modal propositional formula. Therefore, by m-saturation of both M and N there must be an a
By choice of Γ and ∆ and by the independence of truth at a pointed model from the choice of a single free variable in a formula we will have both (α, a
and so condition (47) is also verified.
such that for any formula ϕ(x) which is invariant with respect to bisimulations and any a ∈ D(M ) it is true that
Proof. Let N be an ultrafilter extension of M and let f (a) be the principal ultrafilter generated by a for any a ∈ D(M ). Then our lemma follows from Propositions 2.59 and 2.61 of [Blackburn et al. 2001, pp. 96-97] and Theorem 3.
We are prepared now to state and prove our main result.
Theorem 4. Let ϕ(x) be invariant with respect to asimulations. Then ϕ(x) is equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula.
Proof. We may assume that ϕ(x) is satisfiable, for ⊥ is clearly invariant with respect to asimulations and ⊥ ↔ ST (⊥, x) is a valid formula. In what follows we will write IC(ϕ(x)) for the set of Σ ϕ -formulas that are standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas following from ϕ(x). For any pointed Σ ϕ -model (M, a) we will denote the set of Σ ϕ -formulas that are standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas true at (M, a), or intuitionistic Σ ϕ -theory of (M, a) by IT ϕ (M, a). It is obvious that for any pointed Σ ϕ -models (M, a) and (N, b) we will have (M, a) ≤ Σϕ (N, b) if and only if
Our strategy will be to show that IC(ϕ(x)) |= ϕ(x). Once this is done we will apply compactness of first-order logic and conclude that ϕ(x) is equivalent to a finite conjunction of standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas and hence to a standard x-translation of the corresponding intuitionistic conjunction.
To show this, take any pointed Σ ϕ -model (M, a) such that M, a |= IC(ϕ(x)). Such a model exists, because ϕ(x) is satisfiable and IC(ϕ(x)) will be satisfied in any pointed model satisfying ϕ(x). Then we can also choose a pointed
For suppose otherwise. Then for any pointed Σ ϕ -model (N, b) such that N, b |= ϕ(x) we can choose an intuitionistic formula i (N,b) such that ST (i (N,b) , x) is a Σ ϕ -formula true at (N, b) but not at (M, a). Then consider the set (N1,b1) , x) . . . , ¬ST (i (Nu,bu) , x) } be a finite subset of this set. If this set is unsatisfiable, then we must have ϕ(x) |= ST (i (N1,b1) , x)∨. . .∨ST (i (Nu,bu) , x), but then we will also have (ST (i (N1, b1) 
and hence (ST (i (N1,b1) , x)∨. . . ∨ST (i (Nu,bu) , x)) will be true at (M, a). But then at least one of ST (i (N1,b1) , x) . . . , ST (i (Nu,bu) , x) must also be true at (M, a), which contradicts the choice of these formulas. Therefore, every finite subset of S is satisfiable, and by compactness S itself is satisfiable as well. But then take any pointed Σ ϕ -model (N ′ , b ′ ) of S and this will be a model for which we will have both
by the satisfaction of S, a contradiction. Therefore, we will assume in the following that (M, a), (N, b) are pointed Σ ϕ -models, M, a |= IC(ϕ(x)), N, b |= ϕ(x), and IT ϕ (N, b) ⊆ IT ϕ (M, a). Then, according to Lemma 8, consider m-saturated models M ′ , N ′ that are extensions of M and N , respectively, and maps f :
such that for any Σ ϕ -formula χ(x) which is invariant with respect to bisimulations and for any a ′ ∈ M and b ′ ∈ N we have
By our assumption, ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to asimulations and so, by Lemma 6 we get:
Any standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula is also, by Corollary 2, invariant with respect to asimulations. Therefore, we have
But then we have (N ′ , g(b)) ≤ Σϕ (M ′ , f (a)), and by m-saturation of M ′ , N ′ and Lemma 7 the relation ≤ Σϕ is an (N ′ , g(b)), (M ′ , f (a)) -asimulation. But then by (52) and asimulation invariance of ϕ(x) we get M ′ , f (a) |= ϕ(x), and further, by (51) we conclude that M, a |= ϕ(x). Therefore, ϕ(x) in fact follows from IC(ϕ(x)).
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of Corollary 2 and Theorem 4:
Theorem 5. A formula ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to asimulations iff it is equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula.
Theorem 5 stated above establishes a criterion for the equivalence of first-order formula to a standard translation of intuitionistic formula on arbitrary first-order models. But, unlike in the case of modal propositional logic, some of these models will not be intended models for intuitionistic logic. Therefore it would be interesting to look for the criterion of equivalence of first-order formula to a standard translation of intuitionistic formula on 'intuitionistic' subclass of first-order models. As the class of intended models of intuitionistic propositional logic constitutes a first-order definable subclass of first-order models in general, we can show that such a criterion is provided by invariance with respect to asimulations on the models from this subclass using but a slight modification of our proof for Theorems 4 and 5.
To tighten up on terminology, we introduce the following definitions:
M is transitive and reflexive, and it is true that
The notion of intuitionistic model naturally leads to the following semantic definitions:
Definition 10.
1. Γ is intuitionistically satisfiable iff Γ is satisfied in some intuitionistic model. 2. ϕ is an intuitionistic consequence of Γ (Γ |= i ϕ) iff Γ ∪ { ¬ϕ } is intuitionistically unsatisfiable.
3. ϕ is intuitionistically equivalent to ψ iff both ψ |= i ϕ and ϕ |= i ψ.
For Σ ′ ⊆ Σ let Int(Σ ′ ) be the following set of formulas
It is clear that for any set Γ of Σ ′ -formulas and for any Σ ′ -formula ϕ, Γ is intuitionistically satisfiable iff Γ ∪ Int(Σ ′ ) is satisfiable, and
Definition 11. A formula ϕ(x) is intuitionistically invariant with respect to asimulations iff for any
Example 5. Formula ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ P (y)) is not intuitionistically invariant with respect to asimulations. However, our argument from Example 4 does not show this, because models considered in this example are not intuitionistic. To prove the absence of intuitionistic invariance with respect to asimulations, consider two { R 2 , P 1 }-models
, (e, e) }, P N1 = ∅. These are intuitionistic models. Then binary relation
It remains to note that the formula under consideration is true at (M 1 , a) but not at (N 1 , d ).
Now for the criterion of equivalence on the restricted class of intuitionistic models: Theorem 6. Let ϕ(x) be intuitionistically invariant with respect to asimulations. Then ϕ(x) is intuitionistically equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula.
Proof. We may assume that ϕ(x) is intuitionistically satisfiable, otherwise ϕ(x) is intuitionistically equivalent to ST (⊥, x) and we are done. In what follows we will write IntC(ϕ(x)) for the set of Σ ϕ -formulas that are standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas intuitionistically following from ϕ(x).
Our strategy will be to show that IntC(ϕ(x)) |= i ϕ(x). Once this is done we will conclude that
Then we apply compactness of first-order logic and conclude that ϕ(x) is equivalent to a finite conjunction ψ 1 (x) ∧ . . . ∧ ψ n (x) of formulas from this set. But it follows then that ϕ(x) is intuitionistically equivalent to the conjunction of the set IntC(ϕ(x)) ∩ { ψ 1 (x) . . . , ψ n (x) }. In fact, by our choice of IntC(ϕ(x)) we have
And by our choice of ψ 1 (x) . . . , ψ n (x) we have
and hence
To show that IntC(ϕ(x)) |= i ϕ(x), take any pointed intuitionistic Σ ϕ -model (M, a) such that M, a |= IntC(ϕ(x)). Such a model exists, because ϕ(x) is intuitionistically satisfiable and IntC(ϕ(x)) will be intuitionistically satisfied in any pointed intuitionistic model satisfying ϕ(x). Then we can also choose a pointed intuitionistic Σ ϕ -model (N, b) such that N, b |= ϕ(x) and IT ϕ (N, b) ⊆ IT ϕ (M, a).
For suppose otherwise. Then for any pointed intuitionistic Σ ϕ -model (N, b) such that N, b |= ϕ(x) we can choose an intuitionistic formula i (N,b) such that ST (i (N,b) , x) is a Σ ϕ -formula true at (N, b) but not at (M, a). Then consider the set S = { ϕ(x) } ∪ { ¬ST (i (N,b) , x) | N is intuitionistic, N, b |= ϕ(x) } Let { ϕ(x), ¬ST (i (N1,b1) , x) . . . , ¬ST (i (Nu,bu) , x) } be a finite subset of this set. If this set is intuitionistically unsatisfiable, then we must have ϕ(x) |= i ST (i (N1,b1) , x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST (i (Nu,bu) , x), but then we will also have (ST (i (N1,b1) , x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST (i (Nu,bu) , x)) ∈ IntC(ϕ(x)) ⊆ IT ϕ (M, a), and hence (ST (i (N1,b1) , x)∨. . .∨ST (i (Nu,bu) , x)) will be true at (M, a). But then at least one of ST (i (N1,b1) , x) . . . , ST (i (Nu,bu) , x) must also be true at (M, a), which contradicts the choice of these formulas. Therefore, every finite subset of S is intuitionistically satisfiable. But then every finite subset of the set S ∪ Int(Σ ϕ ) is satisfiable as well. By compactness of first-order logic S ∪ Int(Σ ϕ ) is satisfiable, hence S is satisfiable intuitionistically. But then take any pointed intuitionistic Σ ϕ -model (N ′ , b ′ ) of S and this will be a model for which we will have both N ′ , b ′ |= ST (i (N ′ ,b ′ ) , x) by choice of i (N ′ ,b ′ ) and N ′ , b ′ |= ¬ST (i (N ′ ,b ′ ) , x) by the satisfaction of S, a contradiction. Therefore, for any given pointed intuitionistic Σ ϕ -model (M, a) of IntC(ϕ(x)) we can choose a pointed intuitionistic Σ ϕ -model (N, b) such that N, b |= ϕ(x) and IT ϕ (N, b) ⊆ IT ϕ (M, a). Then, reasoning exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4, we conclude that M, a |= ϕ(x). Therefore, ϕ(x) in fact intuitionistically follows from IntC(ϕ(x)).
Theorem 7. A formula ϕ(x) is intuitionistically invariant with respect to asimulations iff it is intuitionistically equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula.
Proof. From left to right our theorem follows from Theorem 6. In the other direction, assume that ϕ(x) is intuitionistically equivalent to ST (i, x) and assume that for some Σ ′ such that Σ ϕ ⊆ Σ ′ ⊆ Σ, some pointed intuitionistic Σ ′ -models (M, a) and (N, b), and some (M, a), (N, b) -asimulation A we have M, a |= ϕ(x). Then, by Corollary 2 we have N, b |= ST (i, x), but since ST (i, x) is intuitionistically equivalent to ϕ(x) and N is an intuitionistic model, we also have N, b |= ϕ(x). Therefore, ϕ(x) is intuitionistically invariant with respect to asimulations.
Conclusion and further research
Theorems 2, 5, and 7 proved above show that the general idea of asimulation for intuitionistic propositional logic is a faithful analogue of the idea of bisimulation for modal propositional logic in many important respects.
As for the future research, it is natural to concentrate on extending the above results onto the level of intuitionistic predicate logic in order to obtain theorems analogous to Theorem 21 of [Van Benthem 2010, p. 124] . In fact, we already obtained a proof of a 'parametrized' version of such result by extending techniques employed in the section 2 to cover the predicate case. We hope to publish this result in some of our future papers.
